It is one of the odd things about Germany in both World Wars of the 20th Century, that despite occasional wise comments by some leaders (Bismarck, for instance, once said in the late 1890s that the most notable fact of current international politics was that Great Britain and the United States both speak English - i.e., the two countries had a common background that would unite them in times of emergencies) they did not really consider the U.S. a potential threat to their own plans for expansion. Hitler would later add his peculiar ability of insult to dismissal by saying the U.S. was a "mongrel" nation, easy to defeat. It was a surprise to him (as it was to the Junkers of Kaiser Wilhelm's era) that the U.S. was not such a pushover.
German foreign policy in the late 19th through early 20th Century was damaged by the remarkable success record (through war) of Bismarck in unifying the Second Reich around Prussia, and making it the dominant land power in Europe. It suggested that the Germans could achieve everything by force, as they confronted neighboring lands. This overlooked circumstances concerning each opponent: that the first was Denmarck - hardly a major power - was conveniently overlooked; The war with Austria (in the middle of serious internal weaknesses due to Hungarian Nationalist activities) was also a fluke; The war against France was against an overconfident opponent who took past triumphs (by the then Emperor's more brilliant and able uncle) as proof of current military superiority. If any of these states had been better prepared, Prussian arrogance might have suffered a real slap in the face.
The arrogance would permeate German policies. Bismarck used it occasionally, but he was smart enough to create alliances and reassurance treaties to keep Germany at peace with most of it's neighbors and rivals. None of his successors really had his wisdom. The dumbest one was the foreign office head Holstein, who rejected overtures for an alliance with Great Britain in 1899 and 1901 because Joseph Chamberlain did not offer any incentives (i.e., bribes) for Germany to join such an alliance.
The leading aspect of German policy making was to find weaknesses in the other major powers of the globe and prod them. Thus Kaiser Wilhelm II kept prodding his weak willed cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia to confront the better prepared Japanese in the disastrous war of 1904-05. Attempts were made to isolate France in Europe over it's control of Morocco in 1906 and (again) in 1911. The second time France did give Germany some partial gains, but German saber rattling annoyed most of Europe.
When World War I began German agents struck in British and French colonies in the Middle East and attacked Britain by making overtures to Irish Rebels (leading to their sending arms to the Easter Rebellion Rebels, and implicating Sir Roger Casement in their arms shipments). At the same time, German agents started wooing various figures in the Mexican Revolution, such as General Huerta, Pancho Villa, and President Venustiano Carranza. These moves depended on absolute silence and stealth to really be effective in their goal: to somehow get the United States so tied down in military actions in Mexico that it would be hamstrung to assist the British and French and Russians against Germany and Austria-Hungary. They did help tie up the U.S. and Mexico in a quagmire (worsened by the Wilson Administration's paternalistic views on Mexico and it's Revolution). But the German's arrogance never let them realize that British intelligence (under Admiral William "Blinker" Hall) was translating all their messages to the German Embassies in Washington and Mexico City, and finding out what they were up to.
In 1916 Alfred Zimmermann, a career German diplomat, was made Foreign Secretary. He was supposed to know all about the United States (he had once criss-crossed the country by train in three days!). Zimmermann decided to push the Mexican card for all it was worth - he offered President Carranza an alliance in which Germany and Mexico would jointly declare war on the U.S., and when they won Mexico could regain the territory they lost to the U.S. (Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico) between 1845 and 1848. Within a day of sending it, Zimmermann's telegram was translated and sent by the British to the United States Government.
Wilson had been arguing with the Germans about their decision to resume unrestrictive submarine warfare since February 1917. There was still intense neutral feelings against breaking diplomatic relations in the Midwest and southwest U.S. But the publication of the Telegram (and Zimmermann's refusal to deny he sent it) unified anti-German attitudes in those sections. A month after Zimmermann sent the note the U.S. was finally in the war. As for the Mexicans, they decided not to take up the offer of the allegiance with Germany. It was probably just as well.
German foreign policy in the late 19th through early 20th Century was damaged by the remarkable success record (through war) of Bismarck in unifying the Second Reich around Prussia, and making it the dominant land power in Europe. It suggested that the Germans could achieve everything by force, as they confronted neighboring lands. This overlooked circumstances concerning each opponent: that the first was Denmarck - hardly a major power - was conveniently overlooked; The war with Austria (in the middle of serious internal weaknesses due to Hungarian Nationalist activities) was also a fluke; The war against France was against an overconfident opponent who took past triumphs (by the then Emperor's more brilliant and able uncle) as proof of current military superiority. If any of these states had been better prepared, Prussian arrogance might have suffered a real slap in the face.
The arrogance would permeate German policies. Bismarck used it occasionally, but he was smart enough to create alliances and reassurance treaties to keep Germany at peace with most of it's neighbors and rivals. None of his successors really had his wisdom. The dumbest one was the foreign office head Holstein, who rejected overtures for an alliance with Great Britain in 1899 and 1901 because Joseph Chamberlain did not offer any incentives (i.e., bribes) for Germany to join such an alliance.
The leading aspect of German policy making was to find weaknesses in the other major powers of the globe and prod them. Thus Kaiser Wilhelm II kept prodding his weak willed cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia to confront the better prepared Japanese in the disastrous war of 1904-05. Attempts were made to isolate France in Europe over it's control of Morocco in 1906 and (again) in 1911. The second time France did give Germany some partial gains, but German saber rattling annoyed most of Europe.
When World War I began German agents struck in British and French colonies in the Middle East and attacked Britain by making overtures to Irish Rebels (leading to their sending arms to the Easter Rebellion Rebels, and implicating Sir Roger Casement in their arms shipments). At the same time, German agents started wooing various figures in the Mexican Revolution, such as General Huerta, Pancho Villa, and President Venustiano Carranza. These moves depended on absolute silence and stealth to really be effective in their goal: to somehow get the United States so tied down in military actions in Mexico that it would be hamstrung to assist the British and French and Russians against Germany and Austria-Hungary. They did help tie up the U.S. and Mexico in a quagmire (worsened by the Wilson Administration's paternalistic views on Mexico and it's Revolution). But the German's arrogance never let them realize that British intelligence (under Admiral William "Blinker" Hall) was translating all their messages to the German Embassies in Washington and Mexico City, and finding out what they were up to.
In 1916 Alfred Zimmermann, a career German diplomat, was made Foreign Secretary. He was supposed to know all about the United States (he had once criss-crossed the country by train in three days!). Zimmermann decided to push the Mexican card for all it was worth - he offered President Carranza an alliance in which Germany and Mexico would jointly declare war on the U.S., and when they won Mexico could regain the territory they lost to the U.S. (Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico) between 1845 and 1848. Within a day of sending it, Zimmermann's telegram was translated and sent by the British to the United States Government.
Wilson had been arguing with the Germans about their decision to resume unrestrictive submarine warfare since February 1917. There was still intense neutral feelings against breaking diplomatic relations in the Midwest and southwest U.S. But the publication of the Telegram (and Zimmermann's refusal to deny he sent it) unified anti-German attitudes in those sections. A month after Zimmermann sent the note the U.S. was finally in the war. As for the Mexicans, they decided not to take up the offer of the allegiance with Germany. It was probably just as well.
